Truth be told, there are dozens of major urban infrastructure projects that belie the common myth that you cannot build big projects in American cities. These include the depression of an elevated highway in downtown Boston and the construction of a new tunnel from downtown to the airport; the reconstruction and decking of a highway between downtown Cincinnati and its waterfront; a subway in Los Angeles; new light-rail lines in Portland, Oregon, and northern New Jersey; the new airport in Denver and so on.
If infrastructure advocates are not careful, however, such projects have the potential to sow the seeds of a new public cynicism about infrastructure, and that could endanger dozens of other proposed efforts across the country.
This danger is clearly demonstrated by controversies swirling around Boston's Big Dig, a project being managed by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. For several years, the authority's chairman, James Kerasiotes, had contended that the project's cost--it climbed from an estimated $2.4 billion in 1985 to $10.8 billion in 1998--would not increase any further. In February, he announced that costs had, in fact, risen by at least $1.4 billion, and might rise even more. In April, he was forced to resign.
The cost increases, it appears, stem largely from underestimates of both the cost of the project's final contracts and the magnitude of "change orders"--additional work based on design changes and unforeseen construction problems, such as previously unknown utility lines underneath the city. Even more troubling, Kerasiotes, who had vigorously challenged earlier reports from outside overseers that costs would exceed $10.8 billion, revealed that he had known about the overrun for several months and had not informed the governor, senior state legislators, the state treasurer, the state's chief budget officer and officials with the Federal Highway Administration, which is funding a large part of the project.
He explained this seeming deception by contending that he was trying to gauge the exact magnitude of the overrun and develop plans to close the funding gap. He also claimed that he had clung to the $10.8 billion figure as long as possible because it gave him added leverage in withstanding pressure for further cost increases.
Not surprisingly, Kerasiotes' announcement set off a bitter round of finger pointing and heated debates over how--not whether--the state should fund the shortfall. Lost in that debate, though, were two other critically important questions and issues.
First, when are senior appointed officials obligated to tell both their political overseers and the general public that costs are going to be higher than they expected? The answer is complicated because we tend to be ambivalent about giving power to appointed officials.
Second, do revelations about cost increases--particularly when the problems were known for several months--undermine the public's already low opinion of government and public officials? This is a critical question for government generally and specifically for those who seek to build major projects in the future. If the public comes to believe that cost estimates are politically convenient lies, then people may be less likely to support new projects, even if they have great merit.
A more realistic and politically legitimate approach would recognize that large infrastructure projects are notorious for coming in well over budget. Denver's airport, for example, was almost four times what its planners estimated, as was the Blue Line light-rail line from Los Angeles to Long Beach. For most major projects, moreover, the decision to proceed was based on cost estimates that were substantially lower than actual final costs.
In dealing with decisions about the next generation of projects, we should be aware of the need to deal openly with costs. Elected officials and the general public, for instance, might demand that outside experts conduct independent reviews of project-cost estimates and review data on cost increases for similar projects in other locales. And once the projects move forward, the public should demand not only that project managers regularly report on costs but also that they give outside auditors and overseers access to their systems for tracking costs.
Doing so might make construction of new projects more difficult, but it will strengthen democracy and, in the long run, make it much easier to build major projects that ought to be built.
